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ABSTRACT 
Many states and localities have implemented Crisis Information Management 
Systems (CIMS) to integrate situational awareness, notification and disaster assessment 
tools utilized in Emergency Operation Centers (EOC)s and to eliminate separate 
stovepipe communications.   
In February 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the 
deployment of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) as the primary 
means for all jurisdictions and levels of government to share information.  The system is 
redundant with state and local CIMS, which have and are being developed.  
Implementing both the integration and interoperability of EOCs requires that the 
systems used every day be connected; this cannot be achieved through the development 
of a new system.  To implement this solution will require four steps. 
 Jurisdictions utilizing CIMS should do more to leverage built in 
capabilities and jurisdictions without CIMS systems to consider 
purchasing 
 Jurisdictions should integrate the individual information systems currently 
in use with the jurisdiction’s CIMS 
 Jurisdictions should improve their systems’ abilities to collect and store 
information 
 Jurisdictions should create a portal to allow specific information to be 
shared across larger regional areas at their discretion and with greater 
control over who receives the information 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The number of Federal Disaster Declarations has increased more than seventy 
percent in the last ten years compared to the previous two decades.  This increase, and the 
increase in size of the U.S. government, has accentuated the criticality of sharing 
information and coordinating emergency response activities. 
Many states and localities have implemented Crisis Information Management 
Systems (CIMS) to integrate all elements of an agency’s response profile 
(telecommunications, wireless, network, voice, video, and audio) and to eliminate 
separate stovepipe communications.  These systems, for the most part, have been 
centered in and used by Emergency Operation Centers (EOC)s for the purpose of meeting 
the requirements laid out in the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  
Unfortunately, these independent systems were not implemented with a focus on 
integration across jurisdiction and levels of government, and the nation watched this 
shortfall manifest itself in the hours and days after landfall.  The Hurricane Katrina 
Lessons Learned stated that DHS should develop and maintain a national crisis 
communication system to support information exchange from the President, across the 
Federal government, and down to the State level.1 
Interestingly enough, the system to support this recommendation was completed 
one and a half years before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. It was developed to connect 
federal, state and local jurisdictions. In February 2004, DHS announced the deployment 
of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) as the primary means for 





1 The White House, “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/appendix-a.html (accessed October 2008). 
2 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm (accessed October 2008). 
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Unfortunately, the system has not been well received by the emergency management 
community, and many feel HSIN is redundant with already-developed state and local 
CIMS.3 
U.S. EOCs now sit at a precipice where the necessity to promote information 
sharing is understood, but the implementation of a solution to this problem is in doubt.  
Even though HSIN is free, emergency managers have given many reasons for the lack of 
use.  These reasons include the following. 
 HSIN is not integrated with state-owned and -maintained EOC CIMS 
systems, resulting in a level of redundancy in reporting 
 The system is underused 
 There are privacy issues 
 The System is not user friendly 
 It provides few specifics for many events 
So how should the United States implement NIMS, create connectivity across the 
nation’s EOCs and address the lessons learned from the systems before now?  This thesis 
examines why the current method of creating new systems rather than integrating old 
systems to connect EOCs has not met expectations, and seeks to determine how 
interoperability and information sharing capabilities might be improved.  To accomplish 
this goal, the following steps were taken. 
 Understanding the systems currently being used and how they are being 
used 
 Understanding the limitations or concerns in integrating these systems 
 Identifying a set of information criteria to be shared across jurisdictions 






3 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology, Homeland Security Information 
Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives,” May 10, 2007, 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07822t.pdf (accessed October 2008). 
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The results conclude that deploying a new system to perform information activities when 
jurisdictions are already performing the same function internally would result in an 
additional burden on the end user.4,5  The lessons learned from HSIN indicate that the 
integration of current systems would be better received by Emergency Management 
personnel and EOC end users.6  In order to support this solution, this thesis provides a 
road map by which to connect the systems already in use on a daily basis.  To accomplish 
this task, this paper identifies four critical steps. 
 Jurisdictions utilizing CIMS should do more to leverage built in 
capabilities and jurisdictions without CIMS systems to consider 
purchasing 
 Jurisdictions should integrate the individual information systems currently 
being utilized with the jurisdiction’s CIMS 
 Jurisdictions should improve the ability of those systems to collect and 
store information 
 Jurisdictions should create a portal to allow jurisdiction-specific 
information to be shared across larger regional areas at their discretion and 
with greater control over who receives the information 
Perhaps the failure in previous approaches was in how success was measured. 
Success in interoperability and integration of the nation’s EOC should be measured not as 
an absolute, but instead as an area that needs to see continuous improvement.  It is not 
connectivity, which is the goal, but rather, an increase in the willingness and degree to 
which jurisdictions do share.  For this reason, the end users’ wants and requirements must 
be considered in developing a system.7  
Federal, state and local governments should cease trying to find the one system 
that will work for everyone, and instead seek to improve and connect the information 
sharing and CIMS already in use every day.  This approach will yield both integration 
and a willingness to use it. 
 
4 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology, Homeland Security Information 
Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives,” 1. 
5 Josh Jack, interview with Chris Voss, September 4, 2008. 
6 John Hartwick, “Explaining the Roles of User Participation in Information System Use,” 
Management Science 40, no. 4 (1994): 440-465. 
7 Ibid., 440-465. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Aaron F. Broussard, president of Jefferson Parish in the New Orleans suburbs, 
stated if “the American government would have responded like Wal-Mart has responded 
(to Hurricane Katrina), we wouldn't be in this crisis.”8  It is doubtful Mr. Broussard is 
alone in believing Wal-Mart responded better to Hurricane Katrina than the federal, state 
and local governments.  To understand why some feel this way, one can look at the 
government’s system of information sharing across the country. 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) are responsible for the coordination of 
information and resources to support domestic incident management activities, but 
emergency managers do not know how many EOCs exist in the country.9  There are 
hundreds if not thousands of emergency operation centers (EOC) at the local, state and 
federal government level, and the current information sharing infrastructure connecting 
these EOCs consists primarily of the use of telephones and e-mails between people who 
already who each other.  
Using the current information-sharing infrastructure, managing large scale 
incidents requiring successful incident management operations dependent on the 
involvement of multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or 
emergency responder disciplines is difficult.10 These information-sharing difficulties 
resulted in injury in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as the City of New Orleans was 
unsuccessful in quickly identifying and allocating resources during response efforts.   
 
 
8 Michael Barbaro and Justin Gillis, “Wal-Mart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief,” The Washington 
Post, September 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501598.html (accessed December 2007). 
9 Department of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan, December 2004, 
www.scd.state.hi.us/documents/nrp.pdf (accessed October 2008). 
10 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident 
Management System, August 2007, 
www.nrt.org/Production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/SA-385aNIMS-90-web/$File/NIMS-
90-web.pdf (accessed October 2008). 
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The need to share information with multiple EOCs simultaneously is imperative 
for a successful response during a catastrophic event.  Understanding this need and 
others, President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 8 to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by 
establishing a single, comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).11   
According to NIMS, communications interoperability allows emergency 
management/response personnel and their affiliated organizations to communicate within 
and across agencies and jurisdictions via voice, data, or video on demand, in real time, 
when needed, and when authorized.12  However, NIMS failed to focus on and develop an 
information-sharing infrastructure to communicate “across” jurisdictions. 
The after-action report for September 11, Hurricane Katrina and two studies (one 
by the Dartmouth and National Institute for Justice and one by the National Institute for 
Justice) all provide recommendations on how to bridge the gap between the nation’s 
vision for information sharing between EOCs and its current capabilities.  While many of 
the documents present opinions on how the system can work or be organized, there is not 
a consensus, most likely because the current literature provides recommendations for 
specific problems rather than a unified requirements list supported by federal, state and 
local EOCs.   
An argument could be made that the United States has had difficulty in 
developing a successful information sharing infrastructure as envisioned in Presidential 
Directives and the National Incident Management System because it has yet to create a 
model that users at all levels of government find easy to use and useful.  The technology 
solution for this requirement must address user needs and concerns at all levels of 
government, and not just provide a system in which EOCs can share information.  Just as 
important as the ability to share information is the willingness on the part of emergency 
managers to share information.  
 
11 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, February 28, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed October 2008). 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System. 
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The U.S. government needs to re-think the way it has approached a national 
information sharing system, which has always been from the top down.  Rather than 
creating new systems and burdens on the emergency management community, this thesis 
approaches the problem from the bottom up.  Specifically, networking individual CIMS 
should be considered to integrate EOCs and improve information sharing rather than 
creating a new system. The easiest way for the government to support the capability-
specific priorities identified in the national preparedness goals has been to develop a 
national system, such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), but with 
six percent of its HSIN users logging in daily, the system has been too underused to meet 
current information sharing needs.13 
This thesis will review the National Incident Management System, which 
provides high level requirements for information sharing.  It will also examine current 
issues with the previous information sharing systems supported at a national level, and 
the current systems being used in EOCs today, in order to determine if an opportunity 
exits to network current systems rather than developing a new system.   
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II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to identify how improvements can be made in the 
information-sharing infrastructure between emergency operation centers (EOC) at all 
levels of government.  How many emergency responders watched Hurricane Katrina 
devastate New Orleans while receiving most of their information from CNN?  With all 
the funding and focus on emergency management and response, should responders be 
relying on CNN for information what is going on in a disaster area when this is precisely 
the type of information that should be produced and disseminated through EOCs?    
This thesis will begin with an extensive literature review of the current systems 
used for information sharing.  This review includes documentation of the capabilities and 
limitations for commonly used information sharing systems, as well as information and 
opinions on the HSIN.   
This thesis will document some of the concerns and oppositions to current 
systems utilized for information sharing.  In addition, the thesis will discuss systems 
currently being utilized in EOCs, which, if integrated, will create an information-sharing 
environment more suitable for success by end users.   
 6 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. EOCS AND DISASTER TRENDS 
President Carter's 1979 Executive Order merged many of the separate disaster-
related responsibilities into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).14  
John Macy was named as FEMA's first director, and he emphasized the similarities 
between natural hazards preparedness and civil defense activities.15  FEMA began 
development of an Integrated Emergency Management System with an all-hazards 
approach that included “direction, control and warning systems,” which are common to 
the full range of emergencies.16  The central facility that was responsible for the systems, 
as well as communication and coordination, was the emergency operations center 
(EOC).17 
EOCs and the systems utilized to share information are necessary for many kinds 
of emergencies.  Possibly the greatest need for these systems occurs with large complex 
disasters, many of which are given the distinction of a “federally declared disaster.”  A 
federally declared emergency requires a governor of a state to ask for federal assistance 
during an emergency, which requires more support than the combined state and local 
efforts can bring to bear.18  The Federal government then reviews the governor’s request 
based on criteria including the following.19 
 Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major 
damage) 
 Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities 
 Impacts to essential government services and functions 
 Unique capability of federal government 
 
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History,” Federal Emergency Management 







                                                
 Dispersion or concentration of damage 
 Assistance available from other sources (federal, state, local, voluntary 
organizations) 
 State and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events 
The effectiveness of an EOC is often judged during these events, when hundreds 
of personnel flock to an EOC to coordinate the activities of thousands of responders 
across all levels of government.  This was the case with September 11 and Hurricane 
Katrina.  Both events required an enormous amount of collaboration between levels of 
government.  They have also been part of a trend seen during the last ten years, in which 
there has been a significant increase in the average number of Major Disaster 
Declarations per year compared to just 20 years ago.  The numbers rose from 31.4 
declarations per year between 1985 and 1994 to 54.1 declarations between 1998 and 
2007, a 72 percent increase.20 
One reason given for the increase in the number of disasters concerns the 
difficulty in sharing information.  Put simply, government has increased in size, and there 
are just more pieces to coordinate and information to share with them.  Whatever the 
reason for more declarations, the true size of the federal government increased to 14.1 
million workers in 200621 from 11 million in October 1999.22 
The distribution of federally declared disasters across the nation is also not equal.  
During the period from 1953 to 2008, Texas had more Major Disaster Declarations (81) 
than any other state, followed by California (73). The District of Columbia, Wyoming, 
and Rhode Island all had seven major disaster declarations during that same period.  
 
 
20 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Major Disaster Declarations,” 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema (accessed November 2007). 
21 “Big Government Gets Bigger,” The Washington Post, October 6, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/05/AR2006100501782.html (accessed 
October 2008). 
22 Brookings Institute, “Fact Sheet on the New True Size of Government,” September 2003, 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2003/0905politics_light.aspx (accessed October 2008). 
  
Figure 1.   Number of Federal Disaster Declarations by State2324  
Disasters are categorized by state.  In fact, according to FEMA, Hurricane Katrina was 
not one federally declared disaster, but fifty separate disasters.25  Many of the disaster 
declarations were given to states and the District of Columbia for their support of 
evacuees.  Coordination and communication between these states’ shelters was difficult 





                                                 
23 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Major Disaster Declarations,” 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema#sev1 (accessed November 2007). 
24 Unpublished Report, EOC Essentials, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2008, 
3. 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Search Results,” 
http://www.fema.gov/femaNews/disasterSearch.do?pageInfo.pageStart=76 (accessed September 2008).  
26 National Organization on Disability, Report on Special Needs Assessment for Katrina Evacuees 
(SNAKE) Project, 7, http://www.katrinadisability.info/PDFsK/katrina_snake_report.pdf (accessed 
September 2008).  
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it was recommended that “DHS should develop and maintain a national crisis 
communication system to support information exch
DEFINING CIMS 
Many states implemented CIMS to integrate all elements of an agency’s response 
profile (telecommunications, wireless, network, voice, video, and audio) and eliminate 
separate stovepipe communications networks, which helped promote the use of CIMS 
systems.28  The fundamental objective was to optimize emergency management 
operations by the use of technology tools that augmented and enhanced the deployment 
of emergency response assets.  In simple term
uld tie all their systems together. 
Areas with larger populations are more likely to utilize CIMS.  CIMS programs 
have been 
following. 
 Asset and resource management 
 Emergency GIS data accessibility, interfacing, and/or usage 
 Monitoring and data acquisition syst
 Notification methods and m
 911 reporting an
 Source tasking 
 Situation reporting 
 Staff, personnel, and organizatio
 On scene situational aware
 
27 United States, The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 
(Foreword by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism), 
February 23, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/appendix-a.html (accessed 
October 2008).  
28 Department of Justice, National Institute for Justice, Crisis Information Management Software 
(CIMS) Feature Comparison Report, October 2002: 2, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/197065.pdf 




uctured data, and a majority of the systems used XML 
for both
nt for utilizing XML is a reduction in the difficulties associated with 
integra
 Video camera interfacing 
 Preparedness, planning and train
 Accounting and reimbursem
 Data mining and analysis29 
A survey of current systems by Dartmouth University identified CIMS as both 
relatively interoperable and interoperable.30  All of the vendors in the survey said that 
computers or servers within their CIMS program could share data with each other.  The 
most common method of data transfer used to share data within CIMS programs was the 
Internet Protocol (IP).  The extensible Markup Language or XML was the most common 
language for the interchange of str
 data import and export.31 
Improving interoperability between EOCs utilizing CIMS has difficulties 
extending beyond system integration.  Perhaps the most significant difficulties involve 
the willingness to share information between jurisdictions.  All CIMS use databases to 
store data to improve communication and interoperability between these systems; a 
solution addressing both the integration and social difficulties needed to be found.  A 
major argume
tion.32 
To understand the current environment, one needs to understand that each 
Emergency Operations Center has been created without the requirement to connect with 
any other Emergency Operation Center.  While some Emergency Operation Centers have 
created their own CIMS system, others have purchased systems including Blue292, 
WebEOC, Opscenter, CRISIS, EM2000, E-Team, EOC System, LEADERS, Incident 
                                                 
29 Department of Justice, National Institute for Justice, Crisis Information Management Software 
(CIMS) Feature Comparison Report. 
30 Dartmouth University, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Crisis Information Management 
Soft S) Interoperability, October 2004, 
http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cims1004.pdf
ware (CIM




rmation.  Therefore, each CIMS supports the 
EOC it
presentatives within an EOC as well as other EOCs to view critical information 
faster.  
loying CIMS with the specific purpose 
of help
be developed to form a common 
operating picture for a multi-jurisdictional response.   
                                                
Master, RAMSafe, RESPONSE, RIMS and Softrisk, just to name a few.33  In addition to 
there being dozens of different known CIMS options, many states have localities with 
their own systems.34  This is critical to understand because, in most instances, even when 
two EOCs have the same CIMS software, if the systems were not purchased together, 
they do not have the capability to share info
 was purchased for and nothing else. 
CIMS provides a much more efficient mechanism of accumulating and 
disseminating information.  Many CIMS programs collect information based on the 
Incident Command System model or the Emergency Support Function Model. By 
collecting information by sub-category such as “Health” information or “Public Works 
and Engineering,” it allows for easier dissemination to groups interested in only that 
information, and does not require them to sift through information they do not need.  
Most CIMS programs allow for the viewing of information as it is being posted.  This 
allows re
 
The 9/11 Commission Report identified a lack of overall awareness as a key 
challenge for decision makers and responders during the 2001 terror attacks on the 
United States.  Even with the multitude of sensors and communications devices 
possessed by responder communities, an overall picture of events on the ground was hard 
to maintain.  Many response organizations are dep
ing manage the flow of critical event data. 
CIMS have few disadvantages, because they are limited by the lack of integration 
across jurisdictions and between levels of government.  A common architecture for all 
levels of government to collect information could 
 
33 Department of Justice, National Institute for Justice, Crisis Information Management Software 
(CIMS) Feature Comparison Report. 
34 ESI, “Webeoc Clients,” 
http://www.esi911.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=44 (accessed 
October 2008).  
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C. CAPABILITIES FOR A NATIONAL CIMS 
The current vision for EOCs and how they should share information begins with 
the NIMS.  The purpose of NIMS is to improve emergency management, incident 
response capabilities, and coordination processes across the country.  It is a 
comprehensive national approach, applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across 
functional disciplines, and improves the effectiveness of emergency 
management/response personnel across the full spectrum of potential incidents and 
hazard scenarios.  Such an approach improves coordination and cooperation between 
public and private agencies/organizations in a variety of emergency management and 
incident response activities. The NIMS framework sets forth the comprehensive national 
approach.35 
The NIMS framework provides guidance on the capabilities of CIMS not just 
within a jurisdiction, but also across jurisdictions.  NIMS also provides many of the 
capabilities which should be incorporated into EOCs.  These capabilities include the 
following. 
 Resource Management 
 Interoperability 
 Multi-agency coordination 
 Creating a Common Operating Picture 
1. Resource Management 
Emergency management and incident response activities require carefully 
managed resources (personnel, teams, facilities, equipment, and/or supplies) to meet 
incident needs.36  Utilization of the standardized resource management concepts such as 
typing, inventorying, organizing, and tracking will facilitate the dispatch, deployment, 
and recovery of resources before, during, and after an incident.  Resource management 
should be flexible and scalable in order to support any incident and be adaptable to 
changes.  Efficient and effective deployment of resources requires that resource 
 
35 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, August 2007, 
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2961 (accessed November 2007). 
36 Ibid. 
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management concepts and principles be utilized in all phases of emergency management 
and incident response.  In the initial stages of an incident, most of the resources requested 
are addressed locally or through mutual aid agreements and/or assistance agreements.  As 
an incident grows in size or complexity, or if it starts on a large scale, resource needs may 
be met by other sources.37   
2. Improving Interoperability 
Interoperability between EOCs utilizing CIMS has difficulties extending beyond 
system integration.  Perhaps the most significant difficulties involve the willingness to 
share information between jurisdictions.38  All CIMS use databases to store data to 
improve communication and interoperability between these systems; a solution 
addressing both the integration and user concerns must be considered.  Rather than 
requiring a jurisdiction to provide access to all it systems and databases, a system that 
would allow a jurisdiction to control the flow of “its” information with use of a shared 
space would mitigate the social hesitancy to provide access to unknown organizations 
and individuals.  This structure, including firewalls and protocols between state and local 
governments, would allow federated searches through a net-centric Information 
Management system.  A major argument for utilizing XML is a reduction in the 
difficulties associated with integration.  Adopting XML means government would 
not have to junk legacy systems and mainframes, which are very attractive to 
states that have grown accustomed to their systems and do not have the funding 
to scrap them.39  XML makes sharing that information with other entities easy 
and relatively cheap because it is a web-based technology. 
3. Multi-Agency Coordination 
The process of multi-agency coordination allows all levels of government and all 
disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively. Multi-agency coordination 
 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System. 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Shane Peterson, “Crime and the Tech Effect, The XML Factor,” Government and Technology, 
March 7, 2003, https://www.chds.us/courses/file.php/244/Readings/Winter_07/1-XML_Factor.pdf 
(accessed November 2007). 
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occurs across the different disciplines involved in incident management, across 
jurisdictional lines, and across levels of government. Multi-agency coordination can and 
does occur on a regular basis whenever personnel from different agencies interact in such 
activities as preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation.40   
Integral elements of multi-agency coordination systems (MACS) are dispatch 
procedures and protocols, incident command structure, and the coordination and support 
activities taking place within an activated EOC. Fundamentally, the many functions of 
MACS provide support, coordination, and assistance with policy-level decisions to the 
ICS structure managing an incident(s).  A fully implemented MACS is critical for 
seamless multi-agency coordination activities and is essential to the success and safety of 
the response whenever more than one jurisdictional agency responds. Moreover, the use 
of MACS is one of the fundamental components of Command and Management within 
NIMS, as it promotes the scalability and flexibility necessary for a coordinated response. 
4. Common Operating Picture 
A common operating picture is established and maintained by the gathering, 
collating, synthesizing, and disseminating of incident information to all appropriate 
parties involved in an incident.41  When responders are supporting a disaster, they often 
rely on the actions of many others.  It is the actions of the collective responders, which 
produce the overall common operating picture.  Achieving a common operating picture 
allows on-scene responders to see the “big picture.”  Off-scene responders also gain 
because they can react to issues or shortfalls in order to limit their impact on the overall 
response.  
One issue identified during Hurricane Katrina was that Secretary Chertoff of 
Homeland Security lacked up-to-date information on the status of the disaster and the 
relief effort.42  One opinion as to why this was an issue was that the Secretary was 
 
40 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, A Summary of Four After-Action Reports on 
Hurricane Katrina, May 9, 2006, http://www.astho.org/pubs/KatrinaReportsSummary.pdf (accessed 
November 2007). 
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unaware of the severity of the incident or shortfalls in the federal government’s response 
and, therefore, could not act to improve or remedy the situation.  While infrastructure in 
many parts of Louisiana and Mississippi was damaged, the inability to connect multiple 
communications plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and 
communication at the federal, state, and local levels.43 
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the stakeholders who required knowledge of the 
common operating procedure included most of the response community.  As a result of 
Hurricane Katrina, reports of evacuees were sent to all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, yet these states lacked a common system to easily provide both the federal 
government and impacted states the number of evacuees they were housing and their 
locations.44 
In a survey of emergency managers, the lack of a common operating picture was 
considered the factor which most influenced decision making.45 The 9/11 Commission 
identified a lack of overall awareness as an issue in the emergency response to the 
terrorist attacks. If everyone is not on the same page, there is little chance senior and 
elected officials will come to the same conclusions regarding operational decisions.  This, 
in turn, is likely to lead to a lack of continuity across disciplines and jurisdictions. 
 
 
43 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” Department of 
Homeland Security, 4, http://www.siec.id.gov/meetings/2005/Presentations/Dec_05_HSIN.ppt (accessed 
September 2008). 
44 Ibid. 
45 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making, Unpublished 
Report, 2008. 
  
Figure 2.   Factors that have the Greatest Impact on the Decision Making Process 
Within the Jurisdiction46 
D. ONE RING TO RULE THEM ALL 
In February 2004, the DHS Secretary announced that HSIN would serve as the 
primary means for communication, collaboration, situational awareness and information 
sharing.47  Shortly thereafter, the system was deployed throughout the United States.  
The goal was to provide seamless connectivity throughout the fifty states and to all fifty-
three major urban areas for first responder agencies and emergency operation centers.48  
The Department of Homeland Security touted the system as a success during Hurricane 
Katrina.49  At the same time, the development of such a system was identified in Katrina 
Lessons Learned documents released by the White House as something needing to be 
done.50  How is it possible that the development of a CIMS for the nation was identified 
as a need when in fact one was in place already? 
                                                 
46 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making. 
47 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” Department of 
Homeland Security, 4, http://www.siec.id.gov/meetings/2005/Presentations/Dec_05_HSIN.ppt (accessed 
September 2008). 
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
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HSIN allows all States and major urban areas to collect and disseminate 
information among federal, state, and local agencies involved in combating terrorism.51  
In addition, HSIN: 
 Helps provide situational awareness  
 Facilitates information sharing and collaboration with homeland security 
partners throughout the federal, state and local levels  
 Provides advanced analytic capabilities  
 Enables real-time sharing of threat information52 
For states and locals, HSIN is a low cost system to connect to the federal 
government and gain access to situation reports, initial action reports, and continuing 
action reports.  Few debate the necessity to have EOCs communicate across the country.  
HSIN has the ability to meet many of the needs of emergency managers, but the attempt 
to connect EOCs has been considered a failure by many.53 Even though HSIN is free, 
many reasons have been given for the lack of use by emergency managers.  These 
reasons include the following. 
 HSIN is not integrated with state-owned and -maintained EOC CIMS 
resulting in a level of redundancy in reporting54  
 The system is underused55 
 There are privacy issues56 
 The system is not user friendly57 
 It provides few specifics for many events58 
 
51 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” 4.  
52 Ibid. 




55 FCW.com, “Homeland Security Information Network is Underused,” 
http://www.fcw.com/online/news/96059-1.html (accessed September 2008). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” 10. 
 In one report asking Emergency Managers how HSIN can be improved, the 
number one concern was its lack of compatibility with other information sharing systems.  
This same report also identified over 30 percent of the respondents without access to 
HSIN.  This begs the question: How effective can a national system be when almost one 
third of the emergency personnel do not have access and 40 percent find the system 
difficult to use? 
 
 
Figure 3.   Factors that can Improve HSIN Usage59 
As part of the same survey, emergency Managers were also asked, which systems 
they use for information sharing.  The survey was limited and only listed a few systems, 
but it was notable that the respondents indicated the system they utilized most was a 
CIMS system typically purchased independently and which can only be found in limited 
areas across the United States, rather than NIMS, to which most emergency responders 
have access.  The findings also found National Area Warning Alert System (NAWAS) 
was utilized as much as HSIN.  Considering there is typically a single control point in  
 
 
                                                 
59 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making. 
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 each jurisdiction for this system, unlike HSIN, which can have multiple users within a 
single jurisdiction, it can be further deduced that HSIN is not being used by a majority of 
end users.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Usage Distribution of Different Systems for Information Sharing60 
The Department of Homeland Security has said HSIN needs to be improved 
because the system “does not provide the necessary capabilities required to provide the 
necessary trust and interoperability.”61  Much of the Criticism regarding previous CIMS 
including HSIN surrounds the concept of trust.  Put simply “Providing the 
tools/environment and making introductions works better than official mandates because 
you can’t force people to trust people.”62  Usage of any national system will be partly 
determined by the trust one user has in other users in other jurisdictions or levels of 
government. 
                                                 
60 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making. 
61 FCW.com, “GAO Criticizes HSIN Next Generation Management,” 
http://www.fcw.com/online/news/154048-1.html (accessed October 2008). 
62 Haft of the Spear, “How not to Promote Information Sharing,” 
http://haftofthespear.com/2006/09/how-not-to-promote-sharing/ (accessed October 2008). 
20 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
The National Preparedness Goal has tasked the government with several 
capability-specific priorities related to information sharing, including the following. 
 Information sharing and collaboration capabilities to enable effective 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities63 
 Interoperable communications capabilities to enable personnel from 
different disciplines and jurisdictions to communicate effectively during 
major events64 
To enable these specific priorities, knowledge management, information sharing 
and communication technologies are available, but the public sector has done little to 
ensure the entire federal, state and local levels of government can manage resources or 
create a common operating picture during a disaster.  The purpose of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 is to enhance the ability of the United States to manage 
domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive NIMS.65  Incidents typically 
begin and end locally and are managed on a daily basis at the lowest possible 
geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level.  However, there are instances in 
which successful incident management operations depend on the involvement of multiple 
jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency responder 
disciplines.66  For multiple jurisdictions and agencies to work together to respond to an 
emergency, it is critical they have the tools to manage emergencies across jurisdictions 
and not just with other jurisdictions.  
To support HSPD 8 and the National Preparedness Goal, a national crisis 
information management system (CIMS) integrating all elements of an agency’s response 
profile (telecommunications, wireless, network, voice, video, and audio) and eliminating 
 




65 The White House, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5,” February 28, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed December 2007). 
66 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System.” 
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separate stovepipe communications networks is needed.  The fundamental objective is to 
optimize emergency management operations by the use of technology tools that augment 
and enhance the deployment of emergency response assets.67  In simple terms, a national 
CIMS will allow emergency managers to tie all their systems together and allow them to 
communicate across jurisdictions. 
The Department of Justice and Dartmouth studies appear to be in agreement that 
each jurisdiction is different and has different needs.68  For this reason, a national CIMS 
will need to be flexible, but should utilize a known structure.69  The national CIMS 
should also be easily able to the following. 
 Integrate with other systems, such as mapping, other CIMS, and 
telephonic alert notification systems 
 Integrate public health into emergency management 
 Operate within a variety of network configurations 
 Have a wide range of features consistent with the four phases of 
emergency management70 
The development of an integrated CIMS has been a top priority articulated by the 
state and local incident response community to support catastrophic events.71  The 
fundamental objective is optimizing emergency management operations by the use of 






67 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System.” 
68 Department of Justice, Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report. 
69 Dartmouth University, Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Interoperability. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Department of Justice, Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report. 
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The United States has not been ignoring the need for the capabilities provided in 
CIMS, and it may be useful to remember the first rule in providing a technology solution.  
That rule is that “computer systems can not improve organizational performance if they 
are not used.”72 
 
72 Fred Davis, et al., “User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical 
Models,” Management Science 35, no. 8 (1989). 
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V.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH   
Current documentation is available providing the justification for improved 
interoperability and information sharing across EOCs; however, the previous approach of 
having the Department of Homeland Security develop a system and provide a login to 
States and locals to gain access has proven unsuccessful.  The lack of use is not a result 
of the lack of need, because many EOCs have purchased and are developing their own 
CIMS.   
The significance of this research is to understand why current methods of 
connecting EOCs have not met users’ expectations and determine how their 
interoperability and information-sharing capabilities may be improved.  The research 
accomplishes this goal by taking the following steps. 
 Understanding the systems currently being used and how they are being 
used 
 Understanding the limitations or concerns in integrating these systems 
 Identifying a set of information criteria to be shared across jurisdictions 
 Developing a set of high level system requirements to improve 
information sharing 
The audience for this thesis includes the federal government, regional and state 
working groups and Emergency Management Emergency Operation Managers.  The 
value to the audience is not in the individual jurisdiction, but in multiple jurisdictions 
deciding to take a common approach.  It is unlikely that all state, local and federal 
organizations will agree to the recommendations in this paper at the same time.  It is 
more likely that clusters of jurisdictions will agree to share information and use the 
recommendations identified in this report.  A long-term solution might include multiple 
clusters, which begin to integrate systems within their emergency operation centers.  This 
paper strives for a time where all CIMS are integrated into what could be described as a 
“National CIMS,” but understands the first step may be “Regional CIMS,” defined as 
multiple states or localities, all with their own CIMS, but integrated with one another.  
 26 
Success in interoperability and integration of our nation’s EOC should be 
measured not as an absolute, but instead, as an area that needs to see continuous 
improvement.  It is not connectivity that is the goal; the increase in the willingness and 
degree to which jurisdictions do share is the desired goal.  It is for this reason that the end 
users’ wants and requirements must be considered in developing a system.  Different 
audiences will likely use this thesis in different manners. 
 Federal Government – The federal government should consider the 
lessons learned with HSIN and promote regional integration and 
interoperability.  The federal government should also consider national 
standards and resource typing to facilitate regional implementation. 
 State Government – Many states have been purchasing and implementing 
CIMS for counties and cities within their borders.  States should mandate 
the compatibility of these systems utilizing grant funding.  States should 
also consider the compatibility and connectivity of state systems with 
adjacent states. 
 Local Government – Local jurisdictions should research the systems and 
capabilities identified within this report and should chose systems based 
on their area’s known hazards.  They should communicate those hazards 
and system capabilities to surrounding jurisdictions, and should encourage 
the expansion of system capabilities as identified in Chapter IX.     
Studies to date have focused on many of the current systems available and how 
they differ, rather than identifying the requirements by the many users, which could be 
utilized to improve government’s ability to share information across jurisdictions.  This 
report also can be useful to those who support EOCs and are interested in recent surveys, 
reports and end user opinion on CIMS to support information sharing system 
development or purchase.  
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VI. METHOD 
To determine the best approach to improve the EOC-to-EOC information-sharing 
infrastructure, interviews were conducted with five EOC Directors/Managers at the 
federal, state and local level.  The questions they were asked were designed to support the 
thesis research questions. 
 What systems are currently being used and how?   
 What opposition to information sharing between EOCs exists? 
 How do the information requirements from EOCs change between 
jurisdictions and levels of government?   
 If a solution does exist, are there cost limitations or considerations to 
integrating these systems?  
The final solution will resemble a model derived by a process modeling method.  
The goal of process modeling is to explore how people work with the system, taking into 
account the flow of the activities being performed. Process modeling crosses the 
boundary of traditional requirements and analysis, and, arguably, even design, because 
what users will do with the system as well as how the system will support that usage is 
identified.73   
As a result of the literature review and interviews with EOC Directors/Managers, 
a model information-sharing infrastructure was proposed.  With any information-sharing 
technology, resistance of use by end users is critical to success.74  Seeking to validate the 
model by end users, a survey of the recommended model was disseminated to determine 
its level of use over current communication methods.  The survey sought to measure the 
following. 
 Ease of use 
 Perceived usefulness 
 Improved efficiency 
 
73 Agile Modeling, “The Phases of Develop Modeling,” 2007, 
http://www.agilemodeling.com/essays/phasesExamined.htm (accessed February 2008). 
74 Davis, et al., “User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical 
Models,” 982. 
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The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) has often been studied when determining 
perceived use.  This thesis uses previous reports, interviews, and the literature review and 
understands factors impacting negative “attitudes” associated with CIMS use.75  By 
identifying and mitigating negative attitudes, overall use of CIMS will be improved, and 




75 Davis, et al., “User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical 
Models,” 982. 
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VII.   A NEW APPROACH TO CONNECTING EOCS 
From previous studies and the implementation of HSIN, much has been learned 
about information sharing between EOCs.  Many of these lessons were expensive and 
time consuming, but in learning what has not worked, one may find an approach more 
palatable for EOC end users.  A future system connecting EOCs should include the 
following. 
 Address trust issues with the federal government 
 Be user friendly 
 Not create an additional burden for the users 
The federal government has taken a top down approach and developed 
information sharing systems and offered those systems for state and local governments.  
The result of this approach was HSIN; the concerns around this system were identified in 
the section titled “One ring to rule them all” (see page 14).  Local and state jurisdictions 
have been purchasing their own CIMS systems to support their daily information-sharing 
needs and to gain greater control over the information and how it is shared.   
One solution addressing the concerns of end users and meeting the daily 
information-sharing needs of single or multiple discipline response events, as well as 
rarer complex multiple discipline and multiple jurisdiction events, is to allow the 
following. 
 Jurisdictions to keep their own CIMS systems and jurisdictions without 
systems to consider CIMS 
 Integrate the individual information systems currently being utilized 
within a jurisdiction with the jurisdiction’s CIMS 
 Improve the ability of those systems to collect and store information 
 Create a portal to allow jurisdiction-specific information to be shared 
across larger regional areas at the jurisdiction’s discretion and with greater 
control over who receives the information 
This approach is not as simple as integrating the systems currently being utilized 
within a jurisdiction.  For integration to be successful, it is first necessary to make sure 
both that the systems used regularly are a part of CIMS, and that the information has 
 30 
basic capabilities.  Each step in the process is critical, as discussed in this report, and 
addresses the failures of HSIN and the needs of EOC end users.  Table 1 identifies steps 
needed to achieve a usable, integrated CIMS. 
Table 1.   CIMS Integration Steps 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Purchase a CIMS 
(Most jurisdictions 
have a CIMS so this 





an EOC and 
integrate those 
capabilities with 




to allow all 
information sharing 
systems to allow 




individual CIMS to 
form regional 








Pieces (Chapter IX) 
Connecting all the 
Pieces (Chapter X) 
 
Although CIMS programs are common and have been valuable in supporting 
individual Emergency Operation Centers, these programs have not been linked with each 
other.  A study by the National Institute for Justice identified twenty-six different CIMS 
products being used at the state and local level, and no significant effort is underway for 
the coordination of these CIMS products and exchange of information between 
agencies.76  Various levels of government using different products will continue to be 
problematic in supporting future disasters, and the use of a federally developed system 
for State and local EOCs has not been successful.77  
                                                 
76 Department of Justice, Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report. 
77 Dartmouth University, Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Interoperability. 
 31 
                                                
VIII.  IDENTIFYING THE PIECES 
Many EOCs are currently using CIMS systems, but few use all the capabilities 
these systems provide.  Chapter VII identified many of the capabilities for which a 
jurisdiction could use its CIMS systems; however, representatives at the federal, state and 
local level are unlikely to use a majority of those capabilities.78  Much the same way an 
office might not use many of the capabilities built into Microsoft Office, these systems 
have capabilities that are rarely used at all.  
This chapter identifies several pieces of software and capabilities that a 
jurisdiction can integrate with most CIMS systems.  Each capability is identified and 
described along with some of its advantages and disadvantages.    
The Washington State EOC was designed to survive and be operational during a 
major earthquake.  The steel-braced and framed building has a base isolation foundation 
that acts as a shock absorber.79 The facility, which cost over nine million dollars and is 
capable of supporting over 100 EOC positions, is a result of the state’s risk of earthquake; 
the funding available and the personnel requirements also contributed to the final EOC 
design.  This EOC has various factors in common with many others, including the fact 
that personnel, funding, and hazards were primary factors in determining how and what 
the EOC needed to accomplish.  For this reason, it may be difficult to find two EOCs in 
the country that work in the same way and have the same systems.  However, even if 
there are not two EOCs exactly alike, there are many systems, which can be found in 
many EOCs.  These systems enable each EOC to provide capabilities unique to its area of 
responsibility.  To understand and improve information sharing between EOCs, one 
needs to consider the systems the EOCs are using currently to perform this function.   
The systems many EOCs use now cover a variety of functions.  Many of the 
common systems have been identified below and fall into three different categories.  
These categories include the following. 
 
78 Josh Jack, interview with Chris Voss, September 4, 2008. 
79 Division of Emergency Management, “Washington State Emergency Operations Center,” 
http://emd.wa.gov/about/emergency_operations_center.shtml (accessed October 2008). 
  Notification 
 Situational awareness 
 Assessment 
While these systems are not exhaustive, they represent common capabilities.  Each is 
discussed along with its advantages and disadvantages. 
A. NOTIFICATION 
The capabilities within an EOC are typically accomplished through a variety of 
supporting systems (technical and non-technical). The following section focuses on four 
frequently used technology-based systems: Text Alert, Voice Alert, Sirens, and the 
Emergency Alert System. No system is able to meet all user needs, so many end users 
employ multiple systems to support multiple hazards, meet redundancy requirements, and 
support flexibility in the speed and types of information disseminated. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Percent Use of Notification Systems80 
1. Text Alert Systems 
Text Alert Systems are software applications used to send emergency alerts, 
notifications, and updates to cell phones, pagers, BlackBerrys, personal digital assistants 
(PDAs), and/or e-mail accounts.81  EOCs utilize Text Alert systems to disseminate alerts 
                                                 
80 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making. 
32 
81 District of Columbia, “Welcome to Alert DC,” https://textalert.ema.dc.gov/index.php?CCheck=1 
(accessed September 2008). 
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and updates directly to each cell phone or mobile device.  Most systems require 
individuals to sign up and register devices, subsequently allowing EOCs to notify 
registered community members of emergencies and provide information and/or directions 
for protective actions.82  Many Text Alert systems allow registered community members 
to create a profile identifying types of information desired and geographic locations of 
interest.83  For example, some community members desire traffic or information, and 
others may desire only weather-relating information.  Therefore, the flexibility to choose 
alert type was viewed as critical and built into many text alert systems.   
The capability to provide text messages via a multitude of communication devices 
(i.e., cell phones, pagers, e-mails), as well as the capability to personalize messages based 
on community members' preferences, provide flexibility in messaging and mobility that 
few other notification technologies provide.  Text Alert systems are not subject to 
limitations induced by power failures because most devices operate on batteries; 
however, it is acknowledged that long-term power outages may limit continued service 
without the capability to recharge devices or exchange batteries.  One challenge for many 
jurisdictions has been registering community members and their devices, because users 
must sign themselves up to use this technology.84  
2. Voice Alert Systems 
Voice Alert is a communications solution that uses a combination of database and 
GIS mapping technologies to deliver outbound notifications.85  EOC personnel can 
quickly target a precise geographic area and saturate it with thousands of calls per hour.86 
The system’s interactive technology provides immediate interaction with recipients and 
aids in rapid response to specific needs. 
 
82 Roam Secure, “Citizen Warning System,” 
http://www.roamsecure.net/assets/RSAN%20Cws%20Brochure2.pdf (accessed September 2008). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Montgomery County, “Welcome to Alert Montgomery,” 
https://alert.montgomerycountymd.gov/index.php?CCheck=1 (accessed September 2008). 
85 Reverse 911, “About Reverse 911,” 
http://www.reverse911.com/About_Reverse_911_Part_2_0cb6274.html (accessed September 2008). 
86 District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency, “About Text Alert,” 
http://alert.dc.gov/eic/cwp/view.asp?PM=1&Q=563034&a=3 (accessed May 2008). 
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A Voice Alert starts in an EOC, when an EOC representative identifies an area to 
target with a message. The message is then recorded a single time, and that one recording 
is sent to each local phone carrier customer with a hard-line phone in the designated area. 
After they have been initiated, most systems will provide the EOC representatives a 
summary delineating the number of customers called, the number of answering machines 
that picked up, and the number of phones not answered.  
The unique capability of this system is the ability to target localized areas.87  The 
capability to provide protective action information to one side of the street and a different 
set of instructions to another is a valuable tool.  Unlike Text Alert, Voice Alert systems 
do not require action on the part of the community to receive notifications.  Anyone with 
a hard-line phone through the local phone carrier can receive messages.  This system also 
has advantages over several other notification systems in the effectiveness of delivery 
during evening and late night hours when much of the community may be sleeping and 
have other notification systems within their home turned off. 
Although these systems were created with a geographical interface, some 
jurisdictions have found significant benefits in their ability to call pre-identified phone 
numbers.  Most systems are flexible enough to input a spreadsheet or database of phone 
numbers and target this group of people with a single recorded message. 
Most Voice Alert systems are limited in the number of phone calls that can be 
made at one time.88  This could affect the speed of notification, specifically when alerts 
need to be disseminated to a large community, because the delivery of the message 
depends on the number of access lines calling and the length of the recorded message. 
With more homeowners utilizing cordless phones, this delivery method could be subject 
to power disruptions, and consideration for customers needing to be accessed through an 
extension is necessary. With many businesses, hotels, and other locations requiring an 
extension to reach individuals, the effectiveness of this system could be greatly 
diminished.  
 
87 Reverse 911, “About Reverse 911.” 
88 Dane County, “Dane County Emergency Management Warning Systems,” 
http://www.countyofdane.com/ems/popwarn.htm (accessed September 2008). 
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One new use for Voice Alert has included the collection of cell phone numbers 
and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) numbers for the purpose of dissemination of 
alerts to those devices via Voice Alert systems.89  It is also possible to register the 
number to a specific address, allowing EOC personnel to target alerts to people with cell 
phones who are interested in receiving information even if they are not in the area of the 
incident at the time. 
3. Siren Systems  
Numerous siren systems are now available including those that can provide 
audible instructions. Most deliver high-intensity warning signals over a large area using 
omni-directional speakers and are capable of producing a high sound level while making 
moderate demands on the battery power source.90  Many are activated by a dedicated 
radio frequency or phone, and the sirens can be run on batteries charged by a solar panel. 
Others have AC-only, DC-only, or AC with automatic battery backup operation or solar 
charging with batteries that allow for continuous operation regardless of power outages. 
The sound is typically a wail or steady beep.    
Siren systems are often used in tornado or tsunami-prone areas because of the 
speed and reliability with which they can deliver a message.91  One significant advantage 
sirens have over other notification methods is that the receiver of the message does not 
require a TV, pager, computer, phone, etc. to receive the message.  Sirens also allow for 
effective warnings during late night hours or at times when many people may not be near 
or awake to receive messages from other mechanisms.  Considerations for the use of 
sirens include the lack of flexibility and the cost. Although sirens are being developed 
that provide verbal instructions similar to a loud speaker, there are few such systems and 
they have their own set of disadvantages.  Most sirens have just a few sound options with 
little flexibility in the message.  Sirens are meant to get the community to do one thing, 
 
89 City of San Diego, Office of Homeland Security, “Reverse 911,” 
http://www.sandiego.gov/ohs/reverse911/index.shtml (accessed October 2008). 
90 Federal Warning Systems, “Omni Directional Siren Systems,” 
http://www.federalwarningsystems.com/products.php?prodid=2 (accessed September 2008). 
91 ATI Systems, “Emergency Warning and Notification Systems,” 
http://www.atisystem.com/applications.htm (accessed September 2008). 
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such as evacuate or shelter in place.  Communities vulnerable to both tornadoes and flash 
floods would need to be concerned the message they provide does not become 
misinterpreted and put people in greater danger.  This lack of flexibility is the primary 
reason many organizations choose not to use sirens.  The cost to install and maintain 
sirens could easily exceed the cost of all the other notification technologies discussed. 
4. Emergency Alert System (EAS) 
The EAS was designed to provide the President with a means to address the 
American people in the event of a national emergency.  Beginning in 1963, the President 
permitted state and local emergency information to be transmitted using the system.92 
Since that time, local emergency management personnel have used the EAS to relay 
emergency messages via broadcast stations, cable, and wireless cable systems.  While 
participation in national EAS alerts is mandatory for these providers, state and local EAS 
participation is currently voluntary.93 
The EAS allows broadcast stations, satellite radio, cable systems, participating 
satellite companies, and other services to send and receive emergency information 
quickly and automatically, even if their facilities are unattended.94  The EAS was 
designed to ensure that, if one link in the dissemination of alert information is broken, 
members of the public have multiple alternate sources of warning.  EAS equipment also 
provides a method for automatic interruption of regular programming and can relay 
emergency messages in any language.  
Along with its capability of providing a national message to the entire public 
simultaneously, the EAS structure provides authorized users a quick method to distribute 




92 Congressional Research Service, “The Emergency Alert System (EAS) and All-Hazard Warnings,” 
May 5, 2008, www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32527.pdf (accessed October 2008). 
93 Federal Communication Commission, “Emergency Alert System,” 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed September 2008). 
94 Ibid. 
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disseminate a public warning by broadcasting that warning from one or more major radio 
stations.  EAS equipment in other radio and television stations, as well as cable systems 
in that state, can automatically monitor and rebroadcast that message.  
Additionally, EAS equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service 
(NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, 
cable systems, and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost 
immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public.  
Within a jurisdiction, often a few personnel are provided information and access 
to the EAS system, ensuring that its use meets local criteria for alerting and that it is not 
overused or abused for non-emergencies.  Access into the system through one of these 
persons is the first step in activating the system. 
The EAS is one of the oldest and most relied-upon notification systems. The 
speed and flexibility in messaging are unique, and only the EAS system can be activated 
at a national level.  It is the only system that broadcasts messages over television and 
radio.  For EAS notification to be successful, those intended to receive the information 
must be watching or listening to television or radio stations that have agreed to broadcast 
alerts.  During late night hours or work hours, a lower percentage of people can be 
reached via EAS.  In addition, intermittent or power outages obviously reduce its 
effectiveness. 
Table 2.   Notification Systems at a Glance 
Notification 
System 
Delivery Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Text Alert Pager, cell phone, 
blackberry, e-mail 
 Flexibility of 
Message 
 Mobile 




during short term 
power outages 
 
 Users must 
activate their own 
devices 






Delivery Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Voice Alert Hard-line phones  Ability to target a 
specific 
geographic area 




 Must be in close 
proximity to hard-
line phone 
 Vulnerable to 
power failures 
 Delivery speed for 
large impacted 
communities 
 Does not work 
when “extensions” 
need to be dialed 
Emergency 
Alert System 
Television, radio  Flexibility of 
Message 
 Speed of 
message 
 
 Community must 
have devices on 
and be listening/ 
watching 
 Vulnerable to 
power failures  
Sirens Outdoor speakers 
and/or sirens 
 Speed of 
message  








 Little flexibility in 
message 
 Community must 
have greater level 
of training 
B. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
EOCs use several systems to keep situationally aware of incidents within their 
jurisdictions.  Because of the significant variation in the systems EOCs use, this paper 
captures common systems found throughout the United States that provide situational 
awareness, including the National Warning System (NAWAS), Domestic Events 
Network (DEN), traffic cameras, and syndromic surveillance systems. The following 
subsections describe these systems and their advantages and disadvantages for situational 
awareness. 
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1. National Warning System (NAWAS) 
NAWAS is a communications system originally designed and implemented in the 
1950s as a means of notifying and preparing for a nuclear attack.95  Fortunately, the 
United States never has had to use the system for its intended purpose, but it has proven 
invaluable to local emergency managers responding to or coping with natural disasters.  
The NAWAS supports nonmilitary actions taken by federal agencies, the private 
sector, and individual citizens to meet essential human needs; to support the military 
effort, to ensure continuity of Federal authority at national and regional levels, and to 
ensure survival as a free and independent nation under all emergency conditions, 
including a national emergency caused by threatened or actual attack on the United 
States.  
The NAWAS has major terminals at each state EOC and state Emergency 
Management Facility.  Today, the system consists of what is effectively a telephone party 
line with more than 2200 members.96  The phone instruments are designed to provide 
protection against lightening strikes so they may be used during storms.  The 
interconnecting lines are provided some protection and avoid local telephone switches.  
This ensures they are available even when a local system is down or overloaded.  
Local officials use the system thousands of times a year for emergency 
management coordination and response.  One typical scenario is the use of the system 
during tornadoes.  As storms are sighted, emergency managers in one town or county can 
communicate with their colleagues in other counties who are in the path of the storm, 
advising them as to direction, speed, and intensity.   Both the National Warning Center 
(NWC) and the Alternate National Warning Center (ANWC) at Olney, MD are staffed 
twenty-four hours per day and serve as the primary control for the NAWAS.97 
 
95 Louisiana Homeland Security, “National Warning Systems Facts,” 
http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/factsheets/nawasfacts.htm (accessed September 2008). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Louisiana Homeland Security, “National Warning Systems Facts.” 
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A key advantage to the NAWAS system is the speed at which information can be 
disseminated.  With thousands of EOCs in possession of NAWAS systems, the ability to 
ask a question and have it answered by anyone in a number of locations in real time is an 
enormous benefit.  These systems are often used as a way to validate the presence of a 
hazard quickly and to collect small bits of information for jurisdictional decision-making. 
One drawback to this system is that it relies on human intervention.  If no one is 
present to receive the communications, the warning is not disseminated.98  This has 
resulted in missed warnings.  Many alerts are not stored or recorded, which has 
sometimes caused information to be distorted because no record is captured of what was 
said and when. Alerts are all audio, not allowing for easy forwarding of information or 
the capturing of larger volumes of detailed information. 
2. Domestic Events Network (DEN) 
The DEN is a 24/7 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-sponsored telephonic 
conference call network that includes all of the Air Route Traffic Control Centers 
(ARTCC) in the United States.99 It also includes various other governmental agencies 
that monitor the DEN. The purpose of the DEN is to provide timely notification to the 
appropriate authority that there is an emerging air-related problem or incident within the 
Continental United States (CONUS).  The DEN is managed and facilitated by Air Traffic 
Security Coordinators (ATSCs) under the direction of Tactical Operations Security.100  
Since several highly publicized airspace violations have occurred over the years, this 
system has taken a more critical role in providing situational awareness of the nation’s 
airspace. 
The DEN provides updates through real-time audio of unfolding air-space 
violations and the response to the violations.  For many state and local organizations with 
 
98 Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco, “National Warning System Transcript,” 
http://www.sfmuseum.net/quake/nawas.html (accessed September 2008). 
99 Federal Department of Transportation, “Order JO 7210.3v: Facility Operation and Administration,” 
http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/FAC/Ch20/s2004.html (accessed 
September 2008). 
100 Federal Department of Transportation, “Order JO 7210.3v: Facility Operation and 
Administration.” 
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access, the system relies on human intervention; and if no one is present to receive the 
communications, the warning is not received.  In addition, the system is not a two-way 
communication system, so it does not allow jurisdictions to ask questions or users to 
repeat themselves.  State and local governments requesting DEN access are most likely to 
receive monitoring capability only.  The DEN broadcast is not stored or recorded. 
3. Traffic Cameras 
Understanding traffic within a jurisdiction is critical to support both evacuation 
and the movement of emergency vehicles to incidents.  To provide current traffic 
awareness, many jurisdictions are providing EOC representatives access to cameras 
located at key intersections, on major roadways, and on bridges.  Although many cameras 
are focused on roadways, EOC representatives can often provide 360º coverage and 
potentially provide live video feeds of incidents to responders and strategic decision 
makers by controlling cameras’ movements.  Some jurisdictions are integrating hundreds 
of traffic cameras within a single jurisdiction. 
Traffic cameras can provide a real-time assessment of current roadway 
conditions.  This information can be valuable to responders and strategic decision-
makers.  Often EOCs are provided with access to more traffic cameras than can be 
viewed simultaneously. Viewing and assessing traffic conditions could be considered 
burdensome for some jurisdictions. 
4. Syndromic Surveillance 
The term “syndromic surveillance” applies to surveillance using health-related 
data that precede diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an outbreak to 
warrant further public health response.101  Although historically, syndromic surveillance 
has been utilized to target investigation of potential cases, its utility for detecting 
outbreaks associated with bioterrorism is increasingly being explored by public health 
officials. 
 
101 Centers for Disease Control, “Syndromic Surveillance; An Applied Approach to Outbreak 
Detection,” http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/syndromic.htm (accessed September 2008). 
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The foundation of communicable disease surveillance in the United States is the 
state and local application of the reportable disease surveillance system known as the 
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), which includes the listing of 
diseases and laboratory findings of public health interest, the publication of case 
definitions for their surveillance, and a system for passing case reports from local to state 
to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).102  This process works best where two-way 
communication occurs between public health agencies and the clinical community; 
clinicians and laboratories report cases and clusters of reportable and unusual diseases, 
and health departments consult on case diagnosis and management, alerts, surveillance 
summaries, and clinical and public health recommendations and policies.  Although some 
EOCs receive this information through their health agencies, many do not receive or have 
not requested the information. 
Many states trying to capture a more thorough level of awareness have created 
systems, in addition to NNDSS, to provide early warning on community-based 
epidemics.  Although this report does not capture all syndromic surveillance systems 
used by the states, it highlights one for comparison and consideration. The National 
Capital Region (NCR)—comprising Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia—
uses the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE) every day. 
Public health officials use ESSENCE to monitor the health of their populations and to 
detect disease outbreaks as early as possible to prevent their spread.103 
To provide public health officials with timely surveillance information, 
ESSENCE collects and analyzes a variety of health indicator data. For example, 
ESSENCE gathers data from traditional health indicator sources, such as emergency 
room visits and over-the-counter drug sales, in addition to several less-traditional sources, 
such as veterinary visit or water quality data.104  Once gathered, ESSENCE exhaustively  
 
 
102 Centers for Disease Control, “National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/nndsshis.htm (accessed September 2008). 
103 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Essence; Protecting Public Health,” 
http://www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/stories/st050928.asp (accessed September 2008). 
104 Ibid. 
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analyzes the data using a flexible set of anomaly detection algorithms that produce alerts. 
These alerts flag unusually high counts of disease indicators that may occur in parts of 
the population, or sometimes even the population as a whole.105 
After the data have been analyzed, ESSENCE makes both the processed and the 
raw data available to public health officials on a secure Web-based platform so that they 
may perform their routine monitoring and outbreak investigations.  ESSENCE offers a 
variety of tools through with which users can search and visualize the data for 
themselves, including the following.  
 Creating their own charts and graphs of the data  
 Generating maps of disease clusters within jurisdictions  
 Viewing anonymous details of individual healthcare encounters106 
 Understanding a jurisdiction’s available medical assets and the health of a 
community by knowing the number of people with serious illnesses and 
what some of those illnesses are can help decision makers forecast future 
needs and the possible need for federal assets.  Unfortunately, there is not 
a single syndromic surveillance system utilized across the nation, which 
adds to the national interoperability difficulties.   
5. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
GIS refers to any system that is capable of integrating, storing, editing, analyzing, 
sharing, and displaying geographically-referenced information.107  In a generic sense, 
GIS is a tool that allows users to create interactive queries (user-created searches), 
analyze the spatial information, edit data, generate maps, and present the results of all 
these operations.  Many jurisdiction use GIS; however, not all of the participating 
systems are sufficiently integrated with each other to allow for real-time GIS information 
sharing.108 
 
105 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Essence; Protecting Public Health.”  
106Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Medical Surveillance,” 
http://coephi.jhuapl.edu/ESSENCE/ (accessed September 2008). 
107 GIS.com, “A Guide to Geographic Information Systems,” 
http://www.gis.com/whatisgis/index.html (accessed September 2008). 
108 Ibid. 
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GIS is the industry norm for most jurisdictions.  Most EOCs utilize GIS for 
capturing and storing mapping data within a jurisdiction.  The information can be easily 
accessed and manipulated by EOC personnel.  Unfortunately, jurisdictions are required to 
purchase and maintain GIS systems as well as the asset and facility information 
embedded within the tools.  Considerations should be given to cost and technical 
expertise to manage and use the systems, which are sometimes more advanced to 
administer than other mapping systems.  One also must consider the continued cost for 
software and system upgrades. 
6. Global Positioning System (GPS) 
GPS is funded by and controlled by the U. S. Department of Defense (DOD). 
While there are many thousands of civil users of GPS worldwide, the system was 
designed for and is operated by the U.S. military.109  GPS provides specially coded 
satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS receiver, enabling the receiver to compute 
position, velocity and time.110 
More and more EOCs are incorporating GPS tracking systems to monitor the 
movement of assets throughout a jurisdiction, including tracking of law enforcement 
vehicles, fire fighting vehicles, and even heavy equipment to monitor and deploy vehicles 
for snow removal.  Systems often consist of a computer, satellite antenna, and GPS to 
display the location of host vehicles on the computer’s mapping display along with other 
platforms in their respective locations.111  The systems, which are similar to Blue Force 
Tracking but designed for civilian use, can also be used to send and receive messages.  
As witnessed in one jurisdiction, the GPS tracking system could track the movement of 
plow trucks, monitor the position of the plow (up or down), calculate the percentage of 
roadways plowed, and identify roadways still needing to be plowed.    
 
109 Global Positioning system, Global Positioning System Overview, 
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/gps/gps_f.html accessed September 2008. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Global Positioning System, “Global Positioning System; Serving the World,” http://www.gps.gov/ 
(accessed September 2008). 
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GPS tracking offers real-time situational awareness and monitoring of assets, but 
for some jurisdictions, GPS is cost-prohibitive.  Many jurisdictions with this capability 
will consider it valuable for more than just EOC-supported emergency response 
activities. 
7. Plume Modeling 
In a crisis, toxic gas can be released into the air, blocking routes for emergency 
responders and potentially exposing the community to hazardous conditions.112  EOCs 
often use a combination of plume modeling software and information from responders on 
the ground to identify plumes and predict movement and changes in airborne hazards. 
Plume modeling computes the spread of toxic gas dispersions that move dynamically 
with changing wind speed and direction.  The software captures weather information 
either automatically or manually, and allows EOC personnel to input additional variables 
(including airborne hazard, volumes, and concentrations) to create a dynamic plume 
geographic map.  Such dynamic maps can often forecast future conditions. 
One program, Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA)—developed 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Chemical Emergency Preparedness and 
Prevention Office (CEPPO) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) Office of Response and Restoration—is part of the agency’s Computer-Aided 
Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO) suite.113  Available without cost, it 
contains a database of approximately 1,000 common chemicals.  Using information from 
this database, including chemical type, accident location (urban or rural), weather 
conditions (temperature, wind speed, and wind direction), and accident parameters 




112 Computer Society Digital Library, “Emergency Response Applications: Dynamic Plume Modeling 
and Real-Time Routing,” http://www2.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi/10.1109/MIC.2008.11 (accessed 
September 2008). 
113 Risk World News, “U.S. EPA Updates CAMEO® and ALOHA® Software,” 
http://www.riskworld.com/news/04q3/nw04a106.htm (accessed September 2008). 
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atmospheric dispersion rate and direction of vapors from a broken pipe, tank, or other 
source.114  ALOHA can also generate a visual representation of the plume created by the 
chemical release.  
C. ASSESSMENT 
1. Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) 
HAZUS-MH is a risk-assessment software program for analyzing potential losses 
from floods, hurricane winds, and earthquakes.115  The FEMA-sponsored system couples 
current scientific and engineering knowledge with the latest GIS technology to produce 
estimates of hazard-related damage before, or after, a disaster occurs 
(http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/). 
As FEMA describes it, HAZUS-MH can analyze potential loss estimates, 
including the following. 
 Physical damage to residential and commercial buildings, schools, critical 
facilities, and infrastructure 
 Economic loss, including lost jobs, business interruptions, and repair and 
reconstruction costs 
 Social impacts, including estimates of shelter requirements, displaced 
households, and population exposed to scenario floods, earthquakes, and 
hurricanes116 
HAZUS-MH is an easy-to-use, free software program that can provide a quick 
analysis of potential damages before windshield surveys are completed and compiled.  As 
occurs with many assessment tools, in some instances, the software has been several 
orders of magnitude wrong in its assessment.  Some EOC personnel consider the system 
more reliable for hurricanes than other hazards. 
                                                 
114 ESRI, “Emergency Response and Planning Application Performs Plume Modeling,” 
http://www.esri.com/news/arcuser/1003/plume1of2.html (accessed September 2008). 
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “HAZUS Overview,” 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/hz_overview.shtm (accessed September 2008). 
116 Ibid. 
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2. Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) 
SLOSH is a computerized model run by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) to 
estimate storm surge heights and winds resulting from historical, hypothetical, or 
predicted hurricanes by taking into account the pressure, size, forward speed, track, and 
winds of the hurricane.117  The calculations are applied to a specific locale’s shoreline, 
incorporating the unique bay and river configurations, water depths, bridges, roads, and 
other physical features. The model can be used to estimate storm surge from a predicted 
hurricane. The SLOSH model is generally accurate within ± 20 percent of actual storm 
surge heights and accounts for astronomical tides.118 
SLOSH is a proven software application that is easy to use and is accurate when 
determining worst-case scenarios. The software is free of charge and can be easily 
installed on most computers.  Unfortunately, the point of a hurricane’s landfall is crucial 
to determining which areas will be inundated by the storm surge.119  Where the hurricane 
forecast track is inaccurate, SLOSH model results will be inaccurate.  The SLOSH 
model, therefore, is best used for defining the potential maximum surge for a location 
rather than actual storm surge. 
 
117 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes 
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IX. IMPROVING THE PIECES 
It is important to “[u]se a system on a daily basis and not just during a crisis.”120  
This will be considered an important user requirement and it is one of the reasons 
emergency managers have purchased CIMS to support their own EOCs.    
Somewhere in the development of many information-sharing systems, including 
HSIN, there may have been a technology push versus a user-driven pull for information.  
If there had been a user pull, more local emergency managers may be using the system; 
instead, reports show that daily use is as low as six percent of the total 18,000 registered 
users.121  Most of the emergencies localities deal with are small, and the resources to 
respond to those emergencies are fully provided by the jurisdiction in which the incident 
is contained, so the need for an additional system to communicate with other jurisdictions 
is reduced.  The tools many emergency managers use to manage these incidents are the 
systems they are familiar with and use on a regular basis.  Use of a system expands the 
knowledge and comfort users have with that system, and it is the primary factor in the 
success of a CIMS system.  The lack of familiarity is likely to be one of the reasons many 
feel HSIN is not user friendly.  
When emergency managers were asked about the technologies they do use during 
an incident, it should be no surprise that the two most common answers were telephone 
and e-mail.  When considering system candidates for integration within an EOC, ALL 




120 Lorenzo Jones 3, Interview with Chris Voss, September 9, 2008.  




Figure 6.   Utilization of Different Technologies for Collecting and Disseminating 
Information during an Incident122 
Additional capabilities could improve the EOC disaster management, and each 
should include the ability to “search, store, map and forward” information.123  In Chapter 
VIII, each system was identified.  In Table 3, the communication medium is identified for 
each and is compared to wanted capabilities.   
Ensuring these four capabilities exist with each system may also improve the 
ability to develop a common operating picture as identified in NIMS.  Systems including 
NAWAS and the DEN consist of voice updates and, if someone is not tuned into the 
system, the message is not heard.  After a call, it might be necessary to check what was 
said, but the ability to replay is missing.  If the information is needed to compile a report 
or search multiple conversations weeks later, it is generally not available.  Each of these 
capabilities adds to the system and will allow for better management of information 
versus just sharing of information.  “We need to focus on basic capabilities which can be 
added to our current systems now to improve information management.”124 
 
 
                                                 
122 National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), Survey 
of Emergency Management Service Personnel Situational Awareness and Decision Making. 




Additional capabilities can improve information management by being as follows. 
 Searchable – It is often necessary to look at multiple pieces of information 
and review information for like terms or sort through large volumes of 
information to target specific information or results 
 Stored – The ability to document an incident and operational activities for 
the purposes of developing situation reports or the development of after 
action reports is an important process to be followed during and after any 
incident 
 Tied to a location – Many reports either do not identify a specific location 
for an incident, or identify locations differently, leaving a comparison 
difficult.  The ability to map resources, actions or even what part of a 
community might have received a specific protective action message is 
vital in creating a common operating picture 
 Easily reproducible or forwardable – In instances where information is 
being captured, the ability to disseminate beyond a system’s “approved 
users” or beyond a closed system may allow the notification of additional 
stakeholders 
As many of these systems are transferring from older technologies to digital, the 














Table 3.   System Capability 
Capabilities 












Text Alert Alert notification 
utilizing pager, cell 
phone, blackberry and 
e-mails 
Text N Y Y Y 




N S Y N 
Emergency Alert 
System 
Alert notification over 
television and radio 
Text N N N N 
Sirens Alert notification via 
audio sounds primarily 
through outdoor 
speakers and/or sirens 
Audio N N N N 
NAWAS Information sharing 
between surrounding 
EOCs and between 
levels of government  
Voice N S N N 
DEN Notification of airspace 
violations and COP of 
the federal response for 
that violation 
Voice N N N N 
Traffic Cameras Situational awareness 
of roadway conditions 
Video N N Y N 
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Capabilities 














Awareness of health 
sector  
Varies         
HSIN Information sharing 
across jurisdictions and 
between levels of 
government – initial 
and continuing actions 
as well as mapping to 
support a COP 
Text N Y Y Y 
GIS Identification and 
analysis of assets 
utilizing a geographical 
representation 
Data Y Y Y Y 
GPS Asset tracking as well 








Plume Modeling Situational awareness 
and forecasting of 
CBRN releases 
 Data Y Y
  
Y  Y 
HAZUS Risk assessment and 
damage assessment 
information 
 Data Y Y Y  Y 
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Capabilities 












SLOSH Storm surge 
assessments and 
forecasting along the 
nation’s coastlines  
 Data Y Y
  
Y  Y 
E-mail Information sharing 
both internally and 
externally for EOC 
personnel 
Voice/Text/Video Y Y N Y 
Y – Yes 
N – No 
S – Sometimes 
 
The task of expanding the capabilities for many of the above systems is not 
impossible.  Many of the current CIMS have already incorporated the above 
technologies, and the integration of any system would likely require a legacy system to 
be supported by a digital format for any integration. 
 X. CONNECTING ALL THE PIECES 
A regional or national CIMS could be developed to connect information 
management systems being utilized within jurisdictions by connecting them through a 
portal.  To control access to sensitive information within an EOC, each jurisdiction would 
create a shared space within its current IT infrastructure.  Only information within the 
shared space would be accessible to the portal and other jurisdictions.  Figure 7 illustrates 
how this system might be configured. 
 
 
Figure 7.   A National Crisis Information Management System 
The portal identified in Figure 7 shows an enhancement over the current 
information-sharing and interoperability systems by reducing the current labor-intensive 
efforts of calling and logging into multiple systems and then manually compiling the 
information into a single document for dissemination.  By streamlining this process with 





                                                
timely manner.  Quicker identification and movement of resources into ravaged New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, as well as a better understanding at the federal level of 
the response by local officials, may have saved lives and reduced injury.  
Crisis Information Management Systems (CIMS) are often defined as the 
software commonly found in emergency operation centers that support the management 
of crisis information and the corresponding response by public safety agencies.125  When 
used to their full potential, CIMS can increase first responders’ operational response and 
situational awareness, and can help central command and control facilities communicate 
and coordinate the activities of multiple agencies, preventing delays, confusion, and 
ineffective responses.  These programs also have been used as platforms to integrate 
other systems, allowing for EOCs to manage all aspects of a disaster using a single 
system.   
The purpose of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 is to enhance 
the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).126  Incidents typically 
begin and end locally, and are managed on a daily basis at the lowest possible 
geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level.  However, there are instances in 
which successful incident management operations depend on the involvement of multiple 
jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency responder 
disciplines.127  For multiple jurisdictions and agencies to work together to respond to an 
emergency, it is critical they have the tools to manage emergencies across jurisdictions 
and not just with other jurisdictions.  Crisis Information Management Systems support 
many objectives identified in HSPD 8 for states, but adding a portal to connect state and 
local IT infrastructure with other states and the federal government would improve 
information sharing and interoperable communications.   
 
 
125 Department of Justice, “Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report.”  
126 The White House, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8,” February 28, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed November 2007). 
127 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System.” 
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XI. BRINGING STRUCTURE TO THE SYSTEM 
One concern about HSIN is over the posting of information and whom has access 
to the information posted.128  With approximately 18,000 users, many persons with the 
ability to post wish they had more control over who could view what was being 
posted.129 
Any successful information-sharing approach utilized across the country and 
between levels of government should utilize a known organizational structure.  The use 
of a known structure could allow for the identification of groups to improve information 
management. 
The National CIMS should be consistent with the Incident Command System 
(ICS). ICS is the model tool for command, control, and coordination of a response, and is 






The new system should also be consistent with the National Response Plan and 
the Emergency Support Functions (ESF).  These fifteen support functions cover all 
activities that would support an emergency response and have clearly identified roles and 
responsibilities at the federal level.  Most states also utilize an ESF structure, allowing for 
coordination between local, state and federal government when supporting a particular 
ESF. 
Each ESF identified within local, state and federal plans is headed by a lead 
organization responsible for coordinating the delivery of goods and services to the 
 
128 Joshua Jack, Interview with Chris Voss, September 4, 2008. 
129 Mark Gabriel, Interview with Chris Voss, September 2, 2008. 
130 Department of Justice, “Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report,” 6. 
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disaster area and is supported by numerous other organizations.  The value of an ESF 
structure is two-fold: it provides a recognizable structure for many emergency responders 
working in EOCs, and it will allow for easier collection and dissemination of information 
than a general situational log, which compiles all information into the same place.  The 
ESF annexes are as follows. 
 ESF #1 - Transportation 
 ESF #2 – Communications 
 ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering 
 ESF #4 - Firefighting 
 ESF #5 - Emergency Management 
 ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services 
 ESF #7 - Resource Support 
 ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services 
 ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue 
 ESF #10 -Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 
 ESF #11 -Agriculture and Natural Resources 
 ESF #12 -Energy 
 ESF #13 -Public Safety and Security 
 ESF #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation 
 ESF #15 -External Affairs 
Applying an organizational structure to a regional or national CIMS could allow 
users to improve the dissemination of information to targeted groups, improve the search 
for relevant information on a specific incident, and may also improve the willingness of 
users to share information. 
The dissemination of information can be improved simply by allowing persons 
who are posting information to choose the groups to which they wish to disseminate 
information.  With 18,000 users able to post information, a large number of users 
blanketing the system with information might quickly overwhelm the system.  
Organizing information based on Emergency Support Function will be one step in 
managing information. 
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If users posted information to support a specific Emergency Support Function, it 
would reduce the task of searching through entire documents to find information on a 
specific activity or process.  As many Situation reports are developed and organized by 
ESF, this approach could allow law enforcement to view and monitor law enforcement 
activities only rather than sifting through information from fourteen other disciplines. 
All levels of government have concerns over the security of information.  These 
concerns include who has access to the information, to whom they might send the 
information, what decisions are made with the information, and if a national CIMS portal 
was developed, and whether a reduction in the access and integrity of the system cause 
more harm than good.  There is also a cultural hesitancy among emergency managers and 
other disciplines when information is disseminated to large unknown audiences.  Owners 
of information want to control who sees their data and to whom it may be sent.131  
Responders will be hesitant in sending sensitive information to someone they do not 
personally know, regardless of the security of the transmission medium.132  An 
organizational structure could improve the level of trust between users if the portal 
allowed the person in control of the information to choose who was to gain access.  
Factors should include geographical area, level of government and ESF.  Options for 
sharing information for a single local jurisdiction should include the following. 
 One Discipline, Select Disciplines or all Disciplines within a jurisdiction 
 One Discipline, Select Disciplines or all Disciplines within a regional area 
 One Discipline, Select Disciplines or all Disciplines throughout the 
country 
 One Discipline, Select Disciplines or all Disciplines supporting a specific 




131 Department of Justice, “Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report,” 2-3. 
132 Ibid., 2-3. 
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According to emergency managers at the local and state level, these options would 
increase the willingness of users to post information.133  While these options will not 
eliminate concerns from jurisdictions about sharing information, they may mitigate the 
impact by giving the poster of information more control over what users have access.   
 
133 Josh Jack, interview with Chris Voss, September 4, 2008. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 is to enhance 
the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).134  Incidents typically 
begin and end locally and are managed on a daily basis at the lowest possible 
geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level.  However, there are instances in 
which successful incident management operations depend on the involvement of multiple 
jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency responder 
disciplines.135  It is sometimes necessary for multiple jurisdictions and agencies to work 
together to respond to an emergency.  At these times, it is critical that they have the tools 
to manage emergencies across jurisdictions, and not just with other jurisdictions.   
One Dartmouth survey identified CIMS as both relatively interoperable and 
intraoperable.136  All of the vendors in the survey said computers or servers within their 
CIMS program can share data with each other and the most common method of data 
transfer used to share data was the Internet Protocol (IP).137  The extensible Markup 
Language, or XML, was the most common language for the interchange of structured 
data, and a majority of the systems used XML for both data import and export.138 
A majority of CIMS use XML, but the use is not universal.  One benefit of XML 
is that a government would not have to junk legacy systems if a national or regional 
CIMS were to be implemented, which is very attractive to states that have grown 




134 The White House, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8.” 
135 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System,” 5. 
136 Dartmouth University, “Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Interoperability.” 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Peterson, “Crime and the Tech Effect The XML Factor.” 
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sharing that information with other entities easy and relatively cheap because it is a Web-
based technology, but this would also mean jurisdictions not using an XML would need 
additional funding to be integrated.140 
The United States is at a crossroads in improving information sharing between 
EOCs.  Integrating current systems across the country’s EOC may be a more difficult 
task than just providing EOCs a system they can use.  However, the end state is not so 
much having a system that people can use as it is having a system they do use.  Federal 
resources have been utilized to create HSIN, a top down solution to improving integration 
across EOCs, where state and local organizations are provided access to a federal system.  
Knowing that many issues exist with HSIN, and that the system is not user friendly, only 
six percent of the users log in daily.  The system is considered redundant and a burden by 
many state and local users, DHS has announced the desire to create a next generation 
HSIN, and has already awarded a contract for sixty-two million dollars to build the 
system.141  The new system has not been built and already there is a wave of resentment 
and calls for DHS to address “user’s needs,” which the original HSIN never did.142   
The nation can continue to spend millions for these systems or it can make efforts 
to integrate the systems in use every day.  This paper identifies a path for success, which 
includes improving the systems now in use, integrating those systems throughout EOCs 
in the country, and allowing users to maintain control over their information and how and 
to whom it is shared.  If DHS acknowledges the lessons from deploying HSIN, it will 
take a different approach and will not create a newer version of the same system.  
Currently, DHS appears to have a total lack of consideration of user needs and a 
misunderstanding of people’s disaffection for the current system.  The disconnect at DHS 
with current state and local operations can be further viewed in the naming of the new 
system after the old one.  Months after the Titanic sank, who would want to take a ride on  
 
 
140 Peterson, “Crime and the Tech Effect The XML Factor.” 
141 FCW.COM, “DHS Official Defends HSIN Next Gen,” http://www.fcw.com/online/news/153348-
1.html (accessed September 2008). 
142 Ibid. 
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Titanic II?  Anyone want to invest in Enron II?  The use of the old name is likely to 
alienate many of the same users who need access and must use the system to be 
successful.   
The choice is clear.  The United States has hundreds, if not thousands, of 
emergency operation centers at the local, state and federal government level.  
Individually, many of these EOCs have implemented systems to help manage and 
integrate systems throughout their jurisdictions.  In much the same way as the nation 
made it a priority for first responders to be able to communicate with each other when 
responding to an emergency, so must it become a priority for EOCs to be able to 
communicate with one another across all levels of government by connecting state and 
local CIMS already being used on a daily basis.   
CIMS, when used to its full potential, can increase first responders’ operational 
response and situational awareness and can help central command and control facilities 
communicate and coordinate the activities of multiple agencies preventing delays, 
confusion, and ineffective responses.  These programs also have been used as platforms 
to integrate other systems allowing for EOCs to manage all aspects of a disaster using a 
single system. 
A regional or national CIMS would improve interoperability between EOCs and 
would support development of a common operating picture for catastrophic disasters, 
information dissemination, resource requests and management at a national level.  
Connecting the nation’s CIMS would also provide a platform with which to integrate 
future systems rather than to create stand-alone systems.  In short, connecting the nation’s 
CIMS will ensure that we are better prepared to respond to catastrophic events as a 
nation.   
In 2002, the National Institute for Justice performed a survey of CIMS systems 
and concluded the following. 
 There is no best product 
 There is no perfect fit 
 There is only a best product for each agency based on 
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 System environment 
 Scale of operation 
 Sophistication of operation 
 Discipline to implement 
 Political considerations143 
The federal, state and local governments should cease trying to find the one 
system that will work for everyone, and instead, improve and connect the information 
sharing and CIMS in use every day.  With this approach, jurisdictions will not just have 
integration, but will also be willing to use it. 
 
143 Department of Justice, “Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) Feature Comparison 
Report,” 18-19. 
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